Conflicts accelerate structural change in the energy field. Half a century ago, it was Israel against Egypt; today, it’s Russia against Ukraine and, again, Israel against Iran. The 1973 Yom Kippur War and the ensuing Arab oil embargo exposed how Western economies could be trapped by a handful of oil‑producing states that decided to tighten the taps. Petrol queues, rationing and inflation made clear that betting a nation’s prosperity on imported fossil fuels was a dangerous choice.
Fast forward five decades, and Europe’s energy strategy has been reshaped in real time by the eruption of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. The European Union had pivoted away from Russian gas and built a new security strategy around diversified LNG imports. But in doing so, it swapped dependence on a single supplier for exposure to globally traded LNG passing through fragile maritime chokepoints.
The February 2026 United States–Israel strikes on Iran and Tehran’s retaliation instantly turned Europe’s energy transition into a security emergency: diversification does not eliminate geopolitical risk, it shifts its geography.
The analogy with the 1973 war is clear: then, Arab producers used the oil embargo to punish Western support for Israel, triggering price spikes, queues at petrol stations and stagflation. The crisis exposed just how dependent Europe and its allies were on Middle Eastern oil and pushed governments towards strategic stockpiles, the creation of the IEA, nuclear build‑outs, and the first investments in alternatives and efficiency. Today’s shock again highlights vulnerability to Middle Eastern chokepoints, but Europe enters this crisis with lower gas demand, more interconnections and far more wind and solar than in the 1970s, which gives policymakers more room to act without abandoning climate goals.
History suggests that in severe fossil price shocks, some countries fall back on coal as a stopgap. Particularly if oil and gas prices remain high or LNG deliveries are constrained for a prolonged period. Where coal plants do remain in operation, policymakers are more likely to use them as short‑term reserve capacity or to extend closure dates by a few years, rather than investing in new coal assets that would quickly become stranded. Italy offers one of the clearest examples of this knee-jerk reaction. Rome’s official line was a full coal-phase out in power generation by 2025, except for the Sulcis plant in Sardinia, which was pushed to 2028.
The Iran–Israel war and the Gulf crisis have altered this calculus. A recent decree allows coal‑fired power plants to continue operating in emergencies until 2038, effectively extending the horizon by 13 years from the initial national planning. A long‑term dilution of the coal exit that would undermine the EU’s Paris‑aligned carbon budget, which requires a complete phase‑out of coal power by around 2030 to stay on track.
A policy that goes in the opposite direction of those countries which frame the war as a key argument for accelerating the green transition: high fossil prices and unstable supplies strengthen the case for domestic clean energy and efficiency. Clean‑energy deployment is a security tool, not just a climate policy. Wind, solar and battery storage can be rolled out faster than large nuclear or gas pipelines. Renewables should be seen as hard security infrastructure.
In 2019, with the Green Deal, the EU positioned itself as a global climate leader. If, under pressure, some countries respond by reopening coal plants and relying on imported fossil fuels, it will confirm Europe as the World’s most unreliable player. But also the thickest pupil of all. Hopelessly devoted to fail.
Gianni Serra
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By: ONE Editor
Italian professional journalist. ONE Editor in Chief and Sotacarbo Director of Communications and International Relations.
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